ABSTRACT To gurantee the security and privacy of the patient's physiological data in wirelss body area networks (WBANs), it is important to secure the communication between the personal digital assistance held by the WBANs client and the application provider, such as a medical institution, physician, or hospital. These physiological data are so large, traditional methods cannot process them efficiently and securely, thus big data services are needed. In the existing anonymous authentication schemes for WBANs, most of them did not consider when a malicious WBANs client sends a false message to cheat the application provider and cause a medical accident, how to trace the real identity of this client and punish him. In order to overcome the above issues, an efficient and certificateless conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme for WBANs big data services is proposed in this paper. Due to the proposed scheme is based on big data, the capabilities of the proposed WBANs system is better than traditional WBANs. To improve the performance, the proposed scheme supports batch authentication of multiple clients, which significantly reduces the computational overhead of the application provider. Moreover, the proposed scheme provides anonymity, un-linkability, mutual authentication, traceability, session key establishment, forward secrecy, and attack resistance. The simulation experiment demonstrates that the proposed scheme for WBANs needs less computational time than recent schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid advancement of wearable sensors, portable medical devices and wireless communication technologies, wireless body area networks (WBANs) have emerged to improve the quality of human healthcare. As a branch of wireless sensor networks (WSNs), WBANs contains a series of resource-constrained wearable or embedded sensor nodes, these sensor nodes can collect the patient's physiological data in real time and send the data to the remote application provider (AP) for diagnosis through the personal digital assistance (PDA) [1] . In 1996, the notion of WBANs was proposed by Zimmerman [2] firstly and has attracted extensive attention from academia and industry. Big data services allow the use of data processed in cloud environments easily and can be used in heterogeneous devices existing in different networks, such as WBANs [3] . Big data has the potential of providing valuable information to every area of the society and mankind. However, the privacy and security of big data is still a major concern.
WBANs provides great convenience for the real time monitoring of human's health status and remote healthcare. Therefore, WBANs have great application prospects in the increasingly serious population aging. Specifically, Once AP detects that the insulin level of the diabetic patient is declining, the sensor nodes on his body can activate a pump immediately to inject insulin into the patient. In addition, in the process of long-term monitoring of patient's physiological data, which have achieved diseases prevention [4] , [5] . The big data generated in WBANs includes the user identity information, medical records, physiological data, etc., once these data is leaked, it will pose a great threat to the health of patients. Since WBANs are used for clinical diagnosis and patient's physiological data is monitored in real time, the privacy data of patient transmitted in wireless networks is very important and sensitive [6] - [10] . For example, if the physiological data of patient is tampered during the data transmission process, which will affect the physician's accurate diagnosis and treatment; or legitimate WBANs clients do not want the physician and any third party to get their privacy data during the treatment. Due to the open environment of the wireless networks, the WBANs client may suffer various types of attacks. Therefore, it is necessary to establish an appropriate security mechanism to protect the patient's privacy data and achieve secure communication between the WBANs client and AP [11] .
In the past few years, many authentication schemes have been proposed to enhance secure communication in WBANs [12] - [17] . However, most of them cannot achieve conditional privacy-preserving for WBANs. In particular, anonymity and un-linkability must be provided in WBANs to protect the real identities of clients. However, it should still be possible to extract the real identity of the WBANs client from the intercepted message by a trusted authority [18] . On the one hand, if a malicious WBANs client sends a false message to cheat AP and cause a medical accident. The trusted authority can trace the real identity of this client and punish him for his actions. On the other hand, when a WBANs client has a emergency, the trusted authority can trace this client and help him to get timely treatment. Note that the trusted authority is the only one which can reveal the real identity of the WBANs client [19] . Hence, conditional privacy-preserving should be provided in WBANs. To be specific, our major contributions can be summarized as follows:
• An efficient and certificateless conditional privacypreserving authentication scheme for WBANs big data services is proposed. To improve performance, the proposed scheme can perform batch authentication of multiple clients simultaneously.
• Due to the certificateless property, PDA only have the partial private key of the WBANs client. Even if PDA is lost, the adversary cannot get any useful data from it. Hence, the proposed scheme is able to resist lost PDA attack and the previous authentication schemes for WBANs do not have this function.
• The proposed scheme is based on elliptic curve cryptography and there is no bilinear pairing, which efficiently reduces the computational cost. The simulation experiment demonstrates that the proposed scheme is more efficient and highly practical. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related works about authentication schemes for WBANs. Section 3 presents the system model, security requirements and some basic mathematic backgrounds. Section 4 describes the proposed authentication scheme for WBANs. Section 5 gives the security analysis of the proposed scheme. Section 6 evaluates the performance analysis of the proposed scheme. Section 7 presents some concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
In order to protect the physiological data of WBANs clients and ensure secure communication in WBANs, the authentication scheme for WBANs need to satisfy many security requirements, such as mutual authentication, anonymity, unlinkability, session key establishment and forward secrecy. The first remote authentication scheme [20] was proposed by Lamport in 1981, which allows mobile users to authenticate with a remote server over a common channel and both participants can generate the session key to secure later communications [21] - [24] .
After that, many remote authentication protocols were proposed, such as [25] - [29] . The above protocols belong to traditional public key cryptographic and identity-based cryptographic protocols. In the traditional public key cryptosystem [30] , the public and private key pairs of the user are all generated by himself randomly. To ensure the authenticity of the user's identity and the public key, a certificate authority is required to issue a corresponding public key certificate to the user. Due to the high cost of certificate distribution and management, this cryptosystem does not apply to resource-constrained WBANs. Identity-based cryptosystem was initially proposed by Shamir [31] in 1984, which eliminates public key certificates. However, the key escrow problem still exists. To solve this problem, Certificateless Public Key Cryptography [32] was introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson in 2003, which not only eliminates public key certificates but also solves the key escrow problem.
In 2014, Liu et al. presented a pair of certificateless remote authentication schemes [33] for WBANs based on the certificateless signature scheme to enable WBANs users to enjoy healthcare service anonymously. The same year, Xiong found that Liu et al.'s certificateless signature scheme [33] cannot withstand the public key replacement attack and their authentication schemes cannot achieve forward security and scalability. Then Xiong proposed a scalable certificateless authentication protocol with anonymity for WBANs [34] to address these issues. In 2015, Xiong and Qin firstly proposed an anonymous and certificateless remote authentication protocol with scalability and revocation [35] for WBANs, which uses many bilinear pairing operations to make client's computing expensive. Besides, Naor et al.'s protocol uses the KUNode algorithm [36] to revoke clients and application providers, but revocation of the tree structure leads to high storage overhead for clients. To reduce the client's storage and computational overhead, Shen et al. proposed a lightweight and certificateless multi-layer authentication protocol for WBANs [37] . Zhao proposed an ID-based anonymous and efficient authentication scheme based on ECC [12] for WBANs, then Wang and Zhang found that Zhao's scheme cannot achieve real anonymity. To solve this weakness, they further proposed a new authentication scheme using bilinear pairing for WBANs [38] . In 2017, Omala et al. ' s pointed out that the application provider could impersonate the WBANs client easily in Wang and Zhang's scheme. Omala et al. presented an efficient remote authentication scheme [39] to overcome this weakness.
To our knowledge, all the above authentication schemes for WBANs cannot implement conditional privacy-preserving for clients. For example, when the application provider finds that the client is in an emergency, the trusted authority can uniquely extract the real identity of the client and give him the timely assistance. In this paper, we propose an efficient and certificateless conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme for WBANs big data services.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, Some basic mathematic backgrounds are introduced. In addition, the system model and security requirements of the proposed scheme are described.
A. ELLIPTIC CURVE GROUP
The notion of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [40] and computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem are briefly reviewed in this section.
The elliptic curve E over F p represents the set of points P = (x, y) that meet the equation y 2 = x 3 +ax +b mod p with a, b ∈ F p , where F p is a finite field with a large prime number p and the discriminant 4a 3 + 27b 2 = 0 mod p. The elliptic curve E under the point addition forms an additive cyclic group G. Given P, Q ∈ G, the operation P + Q = R can be regarded as the reflected point of R. The scalar multiplication operation can be implemented as n · P = P + P + · · · + P (n times).
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem: Given two random points aP, bP ∈ G, where a, b ∈ Z * q are unknown integers. The CDH problem is to compute the point abP in G.
B. SYSTEM MODEL
The healthcare system contains three types of entities: the trusted authority (TA), the WBANs client and the application provider (AP). The healthcare system of WBANs is illustrated in Fig.1 . The details of three entities are described as follows:
• Trusted Authority (TA): TA works like a key generation center (KGC) and can be fully trusted. TA generates the system parameters and publishes the public parameters. Moreover, TA is in charge of the registration of WBANs clients and AP. TA has high computation and storage capabilities and it is the only entity who can reveal the real identity of WBANs clients from the intercepted messages. VOLUME 6, 2018
• WBANs client: WBANs clients should be preloaded with the public parameters and register with TA to get their pseudo identities and partial private keys. Each WBANs client is equipped a personal digital assistant (PDA) device to communicate wirelessly with AP. Note that even if PDA is lost, the privacy information of WBANs client is still secure and most of the previous authentication schemes haven't considered this situation.
• Application Provider (AP): AP provides various medical services and it is a medical institution, such as a hospital, physician or clinic. Due to the number of medical data is very large, thus AP is equipped with powerful cloud-based computing and storage resources in our system. AP also need to register with TA and preload the public parameters before offering remote treatment and healthcare monitoring to WBANs clients. Note that AP cannot get the real identity of the WBANs client.
C. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
It is important to ensure the security and privacy of WBANs clients. Based on the above healthcare system model and the latest research efforts, the security requirements of the proposed scheme are as follows: 1) Anonymity: In order to protect the privacy of the WBANs client, anyone (except TA) is not able to extract the real identity of the requesting client by analyzing the intercepted messages. 2) Un-Linkability: The adversary and malicious clients are not able to link two messages sent by the same WBANs client. 3) Mutual Authentication: The WBANs client and AP should be able to authenticate each other to ensure the message sent by the legal participant and avoid potential attacks. 4) Tranceability: When AP finds that the WBANs client is in case of an emergency, TA is the only authorized entity that can extract the client's real identity by analyzing his request message. 5) Session Key Establishment: Due to the physiological data collected by PDA is highly private and sensitive, a session key between the WBANs client and AP should be established to secure the subsequent communication. 6) Forward Secrecy: The transmitted medical data in the previous session encrypted by the session key is still secure, even if the private keys of AP and the WBANs client has been compromised. 7) Attack Resistance: The proposed scheme is able to resist various attacks, such as the replay attack, the impersonation attack, the modification attack, the lost PDA attack and the man-in-the-middle attack that exist in WBANs.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, an efficient and certificateless authentication scheme without the bilinear pairing for WBANs is proposed. The proposed scheme supports batch authentication of multiple clients. Due to the certificateless property, even the WBANs client lost his PDA, the adversary still cannot get any useful data. The important notations used in this paper and their corresponding meanings are summarized in Table 1 . The proposed scheme comprises four phases: system initialization, pseudo identity generation and message signing, authentication and password change phase. The details of these phases are as follows: 
A. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION PHASE
In this phase, TA first generates the system parameters and publishes the public parameters, then AP registers with TA to get its private key as follows: 1) Given a security parameter l, TA selects two primes p, q and generates an elliptic curve group G with order q defined over a finite field F p . 2) P is a generator of the group G, then TA randomly chooses s ∈ Z * q as the master private key and computes P pub = sP as the system public key.
3) TA selects four secure cryptography hash functions: 
Eventually, TA loads the pseudo identity PID i , the partial private key y i , Y i and β into the client's PDA. 3) After the above steps, the client's private key pair is SK i = (x i , y i ) and public key pair is PK i = (X i , Y i ). The client's public key pair PK i is stored in the public tree for accessing. Note that PDA doesn't have the client's secret key x i and the client doesn't know the partial private key y i stored in PDA. 4) The client inputs the real identity RID i and password PW i into its PDA, then PDA computes β * = H 0 (RID i ) ⊕ H 0 (PW i ) and checks whether β * is equal to the store one. PDA rejects the request of the client if β * and the stored β are not equal. 5) If β * and the stored β are equal, the client inputs the secret key x i into its PDA and PDA randomly chooses a secret number d i ∈ Z * q . After that, PDA computes
and M i is a medical related message, such as service type and client's rights. PDA sends the request message {PID i , M i , σ i , D i , t i } to AP, where t i is the current timestamp.
C. AUTHENTICATION PHASE
To ensure the validity of the received data and generate the session key, the WBANs client and AP can authenticate each other in this phase. Note that the proposed scheme supports batch authentication function which allows AP to check the validity of multiple request messages at the same time to improve performance. This phase is divided into two parts which are described as follows.
1) INDIVIDUAL AUTHENTICATION OF SINGLE CLIENT
Once receiving the request message 
2) BATCH AUTHENTICATION OF MULTIPLE CLIENTS
In the previous authentication scheme for WBANs, AP has to authenticate the client one by one, which is very inefficient. To improve performance, AP can actually perform batch authentication of multiple clients to save the computational cost in the proposed scheme.
Upon receiving multiple request messages
. ., {PID n , M n , σ n , D n , t n } from the WBANs clients, AP verifies the validity of these request messages as follows: 1) AP checks the freshness of t 1 , t 2 , . . ., t n . If these timestamp are not fresh, AP rejects these messages. 2) Otherwise, AP accesses the public tree to get these request clients' public key pair by using their pseudo identities. Afterwards, AP computes
, where i = 1, 2, . . . , n. 3) AP checks if the following equation holds or not.
If it holds, AP accepts these request messages; otherwise, AP rejects these request messages.
4) AP computes the common session keys
for each requesting client who passed the verification, where i = 1, 2, . . . , n. AP computes the message authentication codes MAC K i (B A ) and sends them to the requesting clients. 
To guarantee the security of data stored in PDA, the WBANs client can change his PDA's password locally without interacting with TA in this phase. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we demonstrate that the proposed scheme for WBANs could meet the security requirements mentioned in Section 3. Besides, the security comparisons with two recent schemes are given in Table 2 . 
1) Anonymity:
The real identity RID i of the WBANs client is involved in his pseudo identity PID i = {PID i,1 , PID i,2 , T } generated by the client and TA, where PID i,1 = r i P, PID i,2 = RID i ⊕ H 2 (sPID i,1 , T ) and P pub = sP. To get the real identity RID i form PID i,2 = RID i ⊕ H 2 (sPID i,1 , T ), the adversary has to compute s · PID i,1 = s · r i · P from P pub = sP and PID i,1 = r i P. Hence, the adversary need to solve the CDH problem. Due to the hardness of the CDH problem, the proposed scheme provides clients' anonymity.
2) Un-linkability: The WBANs client and his PDA generate two random numbers r i , d i ∈ Z * q respectively to generate the request message 
Therefore, the adversary has to solve the CDH problem. Due to the intractability of the CDH problem, the proposed scheme achieves session key establishment. 6) Forward secrecy: After the successful authentication, both the WBANs client and AP are able to generate the session key
q is involved in the session key K i . Due to the randomness of d i , even if the adversary gets the current session key, he still cannot achieve the previous session keys. Hence, the proposed scheme provides forward secrecy.
7)
Attack Resistance: We demonstrate that the proposed scheme can resist the replay attack, the impersonation attack, the modification attack, lost PDA attack and man-in-themiddle attack as follows:
a Replay Attack: If the adversary intercepts the request message {PID i , M i , σ i , D i , t i } and replays it to AP. AP first checks the validity of the current timestamp t i and T in PID i , then AP will find the replay attack easily due to the invalidity of t i and T . In addition, the WBANs client and his PDA generate two new numbers r i , d i ∈ Z * q in each session. Hence, the adversary will fail to pass the authentication. b Impersonation Attack: In order to impersonate the WBANs client, the adversary has to generate a request Hence, the proposed scheme can resist man-in-themiddle attack. The security of the proposed scheme for WBANs is compared with two recently proposed authentication schemes [41] , [42] for WBANs. Let Anon, Unl, MA, Tra, SKE, FS and AR denote anonymity, un-linkability, mutual authentication, tranceability, session key establishment, forward secrecy and attack resistance respectively. The security comparisons of these schemes are listed in Table 2 . Here, '' √ '' indicates the requirement is satisfied and ''×'' denotes the requirement is not satisfied.
According to Table 2 , Wu's scheme [41] and He's scheme [42] cannot satisfy all the security requirements. In particular, both of them do not have the conditional privacy-preserving property and cannot withstand lost PDA attack. Besides, the proposed scheme for WBANs could satisfy all seven security requirements listed in Table 2 . Hence, the proposed scheme is more secure than Wu et al.'s scheme [41] and He et al.'s scheme [42] .
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, the performance analysis of the proposed scheme for WBANs is given. We compare the computational cost of the proposed scheme with two most recent authentication schemes [41] , [42] for WBANs.
The computational cost of the authentication phase is evaluated by comparing the total time consumption of each scheme's basic cryptographic operations. For convenience, some notations are defined as follows: T m denotes the execution time of one scalar multiplication operation, T e denotes the execution time of one exponentiation operation, T p denotes the execution time of one bilinear pairing operation. In the proposed scheme, the WBANs Client needs to compute one scalar multiplication operation to generate the signature D i , σ i and two scalar multiplication operations to generate the session key K i . Hence, the execution time of client is 3T m . AP needs to compute 3n + 2 scalar multiplication operations to perform batch authentication of multiple clients, where n denotes the number of clients. AP also needs to compute n scalar multiplication operations to generate the session keys K i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) of these clients. Hence, the execution time of AP is (4n+2)T m . We compare the computational cost of the proposed scheme with two recent schemes in Table 3 .
To quantify the execution time of the cryptographic operations, the simulation experiment is established. The simulation experiment is implemented on a desktop running Windows 8 with a 2.50 CHz Intel Core i5-2450 CPU and 8.00 GB memory. We use PBC (pairing based cryptography) to compute the running time of above cryptographic operations. The execution time are T m = 2.576 ms, T e = 3.857 ms and T p = 4.163 ms. Fig. 2 shows that the computational time of the WBANs client in the proposed scheme is much lower than Wu et al.'s scheme [41] and He et al.'s scheme [42] .
In addition, we compare the computational time of batch authentication in the proposed scheme with two recent authentication schemes for WBANs as shown in Fig. 3. Fig. 3 illustrates that the computational time of AP is increases linearly with the increasing number of the WBANs clients, which demonstrates that the proposed scheme requires less computational time than Wu et al.'s scheme [41] and He et al.'s scheme [42] . Hence, the proposed scheme is more efficient and highly practical.
VII. CONCLUSION
Recently, there is no anonymous authentication scheme for WBANs that support conditional privacy-preserving for the WBANs client. Motivated by this, we proposed an efficient and certificateless conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme for WBANs big data services. To reduce the computational cost of the application provider, the proposed scheme can satisfy batch authentication of multiple clients at the same time. Moreover, due to the certificateless property, the proposed scheme can resist lost PDA attack which the previous authentication schemes for WBANs haven't considered. In addition, the proposed scheme achieves many security properties, such as anonymity, un-linkability, mutual authentication, session key establishment et al.. The performance analysis demonstrates that the proposed scheme for WBANs is efficient and highly practical.
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